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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with the process of convergence of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
towards the EU and attempts to identify the main driving factors behind this process. In these regards, we 
first provide an overview of the real convergence through an analysis of several economic variables – rate 
of approximation of real GDP per capita and price levels, trade integration, harmonization of the economic 
structure and achievements in the labor market. In addition, we offer a formal econometric evidence on the 
main determinants of the convergence process, based on a panel data for 10 CEE countries during 2000-
2015 period, estimated with fixed effects. The results of our study imply that higher savings and investment 
ratio, higher labour productivity, more efficient labour markets (lower unemployment) and macroeconomic 
stability (lower inflation and lower budget deficits) are conducive to real convergence. However, quite 
surprisingly, we find that the close trade integration with the EU is associated with lower level of real 
convergence. 
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1. Introduction 
The accession process of former communist economies from CEE in the EU is a long-term process 
conditioned on the fulfillment of numerous political, legal and economic criteria. Meeting these 
criteria should create a satisfactory level of political, legal and economic convergence with EU 
standards. Unlike the first two criteria, the economic criteria are only partially formalized and 
mainly relate to nominal economic variables defined and provided in the Maastricht Treaty: price 
stability, sustainability of public finance, foreign exchange rate stability and parity of long-term 
interest rates. Analyses of the changes in these variables are usually used to evaluate the nominal 
convergence of a country. In addition to the formal economic criteria, economic literature in this 
area identifies some other criteria ensuring the convergence of economic structures and cohesion 
in the member states and candidate countries for EU membership. 
Convergence is a process describing the progress of a country towards elimination of disparities 
in the levels of outputs and income. In literature there are two basic measures of the process of real 
convergence, known as β-convergence and σ–convergence. The first indicator shows the tendency 
of poorer countries to approach the level of development of richer countries (the usual tendency 
of poorer countries to grow faster than more developed countries). The realization of this 
convergence depends on internal economic policies and other country specific factors, and 
fundamentally shows how long the convergence process will last. The second indicator shows the 
tendency of reducing the differences in the level of income per capita between different countries 
over time (Barro and Sala-i Martin 1990, Barro et al. 1991). Similarly, Galor (1996) distinguishes 
three types of convergence: absolute (unconditional) convergence, conditional convergence, and 
convergence clubs, depending on whether the initial conditions and the economic structure are 
taken into account. Van de Coevering (1996) defines convergence as a two-dimensional process: 
the catch-up of the level of income as well as the business cycle synchronization. 
The main research task in this paper is to evaluate the progress of CEE economies towards meeting 
the criteria for nominal and real convergence by employing various economic variables. In these 
regards, we provide some basic descriptive statistics, which shows the developments in several 
areas during the period between 1997 and 2014. Bearing in mind the multi-dimensional nature of 
real convergence, we analyze the process of real convergence of CEE economies by employing 
the following indicators: GDP per capita (according to the purchasing power parity), trade 
openness and trade integration with the EU, unemployment and poverty, relative labour 
productivity and wages, and the economic structure as represented by the composition of GDP 
(See Miron et al. 2009). In addition, we offer a formal econometric evidence on the main 
determinants of the real convergence process. Based on a panel data for 10 countries during 2000-
2015, estimated by the fixed-effects estimator, we find the following main results: the standard 
variables in the growth literature (domestic savings and investment ratios), higher labour 
productivity and banking sector reforms are positively associated with real convergence. On the 
other hand, we find a negative association between unemployment, inflation, and budget deficits. 
All these findings are in line with our a priori expectations about the signs of the regression 
coefficients. In addition, we obtain one puzzling result – the negative association between real 
convergence and the trade integration with the EU, which calls for further research in order to be 
rationalized. 
As for the structure of the paper, the next section provides an overview of the empirical literature 
on the real convergence process in the CEE countries; Section 3 presents some basic descriptive 
statistics on various indicators related to the convergence process; Section 4 offers empirical 
evidence on the real convergence of CEE countries, while the last section concludes. 
 
2. Brief review of the empirical literature on real convergence in the EU 
 
The creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the subsequent large-scale 
accession of the former transition economies has spurred the research in the nominal and real 
convergence in the EU. In what follows we list only a selected papers in this field. Barro et al. 
(1991) study the convergence process in 73 regions within the EU during 1950-1985 and find that 
the convergence proceeds slowly at the rate of 2% annually. In the same manner, weak evidence 
for the convergence within the EMU can be found in Roubini et al. (2007). Doyle et al. (2001) 
analyse the long-term prospects for convergence of the CEE economies and conclude that the 
growth potential in these countries is driven mostly by the total factor productivity, conditioned 
on preserving sound macroeconomic environment. Studying the general price-level differentials, 
Égert (2007) shows that the former transition economies are characterized by lower prices in 
virtually all groups of goods and services. However, he finds a limited role of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect in the convergence of the price level due to the incomplete pass-through from 
labour productivity to prices. According to his comprehensive study the convergence in the price 
level is mostly driven by the prices of tradables and non-market nontradables.  
Lavrac и Zumer (2003), Halmail and Vásáry (2010), Alexe (2012), Sopek (2013), and Dubra 
(2014) investigate the real convergence process during several time periods – before the large 
accession episode, after the accession of the new member-states, and the period following the 
Global financial and economic crisis. These papers provide evidence that during the post-accession 
period the new member-states are characterized by higher rates of β-convergence, mostly as a 
result of the growth in domestic demand, especially, private consumption and investment. 
However, recently, the convergence process has slowed down or even stopped in some countries 
as a consequence of the Global financial and economic crisis. In these regards, on the basis of their 
long-term growth projections, Halmail and Vásáry (2010) conclude that the convergence process 
is likely to stop around 2030 leaving most of the new member-states considerably below the 
average GDP per capita level in the EU. 
 
3. Measuring real convergence – some stylized facts 
 
3.1. GDP per capita according to Purchasing Power Parity 
 
Figure 1 shows the convergence in income and price level for a sample of 12 CEE countries, which, 
along with the new member-states, for reference includes Macedonia, too. Measured by the most 
widely used real convergence indicator, GDP per capita as calculated according to Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP), the dynamics of real convergence is highest in the Baltic States (growth of 
30-36 p.p.). Also, there is a significant advancement in Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Poland 
(growth of 21-26 p.p.). The dynamics of real convergence of the Macedonian economy is almost 
identical to Croatia and the Czech Republic, and higher than Slovenia (cumulative growth of only 
5 p.p.). However, in this comparisons we must take into account the starting level of income of 
individual countries: in 1997, the GDP per capita of Slovenia was 78% of the EU average, it was 
76% in the Czech Republic, and 51% in Croatia 51%. This is important because, according to the 
neoclassical theory of growth, economies with a lower starting level of income have a tendency to 
grow faster than economies with higher initial income level. 
In addition, Figure 1 shows that the process of income convergence is always accompanied with 
the convergence in the price level to the EU average. In fact, in many countries, there is an almost 
identical convergence of GDP per capita and the price level (the 45о line). In addition to the general 
trend of real convergence in the last 20 years, it is interesting to analyze the achievements of 
individual countries in separate periods of time (Table 1). For this purpose, we have identified 
three sub-periods: 1997-2003, as the period before the accession of the ten countries in the EU; 
2004-2008, as the period following the accession of the new member states in the EU; and 2009-
2014, as the period after the Global financial and economic crisis. This way we attempt to explore 
the dynamics of real convergence before their entry into the EU, the effects from the entry into the 
EU, and the effects of the crisis on the real convergence process. 
 Figure 1. Convergence of GDP per capita and the price level in the new member states, 
1997-2014 
 
Notes: Price level, EU–28=100; GDP per capita in PPP, EU-28=100. 
Source: EUROSTAT, own calculations and adjustments 
During the pre-accession period, the Baltic countries and Hungary were the leaders in the 
convergence process while there was virtually no convergence in Poland, Macedonia, Romania 
and the Czech Republic. Indeed, one can conclude that the convergence process was very slow in 
most of the CEE countries, probably reflecting the low progress in macroeconomic, structural and 
institutional reforms. In most of the analyzed countries, the most important real convergence 
dynamics has been realized in the period 2004-2008, which indicates positive effects from EU 
membership. During these years, Slovakia, Romania and the Baltic countries were the leaders in 
the convergence process while the Czech Republic and Hungary experienced very slow 
convergence towards the EU average level of income. In the period after 2008, reflecting the 
adverse consequences of the crisis, there is a certain slowdown in the convergence of all countries 
(with the exception of Poland). In fact, Croatia and Slovenia experienced considerable divergence 
during the post-crisis period. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. GDP per capita (PPP) of CEE countries, 1997-2014            
Country 1997-2003 2004-2008 2009-2014 1997-2014 
Lithuania 10 14 12 36 
Estonia 10 16 8 34 
Latvia 10 15 4 29 
Romania 2 17 7 26 
Slovakia 4 17 5 26 
Bulgaria 7 11 3 21 
Poland 1 6 14 21 
Hungary 10 1 5 16 
Macedonia 0 7 4 10 
Czech Republic 1 4 4 9 
Croatia 5 7 -4 8 
Slovenia 5 6 -6 5 
Note: Changes throughout the period, ЕУ-28=100, in p.p. 
Source: EUROSTAT, own calculations and adjustments 
 
3.2. Openness and market integration with the EU 
 
Openness of the economy and its trade integration with the EU are important preconditions for 
successful accession within the EU. Basically, the theoretical debate on this indicator, which 
largely arises from the theory of optimal currency area, suggests that greater openness and trade 
integration lead to better adjustment between business cycles between the countries. This is 
necessary in order to minimize the appearance of asymmetric shocks which, if not neutralized by 
functional alternative adjustment mechanisms (flexible wages and prices), would result in lower 
economic performance. In what follows, we will analyze the openness and market integration of 
the CEE economies with the EU. 
Figure 2 clearly shows that most of the new member states (Croatia and Romania are the only 
outliers) have above the average trade openness with Slovakia, the Czech Republic and the Baltic 
countries being the leaders. In addition, it can be seen that the degree of openness has increased in 
most of the countries during the analyzed period. Finally, it seems that these countries are open on 
both the exports and imports side. As for the trade integration with the EU (Figure 3), one can 
observe that the new EU member states had achieved a relatively high level of trade integration at 
the moment of their EU accession. From that point on, the degree of trade integration has been 
stagnant while in many countries it has been declining over the analyzed period. Macedonia is a 
striking exception from this general trend since it has almost doubled its trade with the EU. 
Figure 2. Trade openness in CEE countries, 1997-2014 
 
Note: Export and import of goods and services as % of GDP. 
Source: EUROSTAT, World Bank, IMF, own calculations 
 
Figure 3. Trade integration of CEE countries, 1999-2014 
 
Note: The percentage share of exports to EU in total exports,      
Source: EUROSTAT, World Bank, IMF, own calculations 
 
3.3. Unemployment and poverty 
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Labour market and poverty are two areas with pretty large differences between the old and the new 
member states. Figure 4 shows the rates of unemployment in the EU for the period 2005 to 2014. 
As can be seen, although unemployment has risen throughout the EU following the Global 
economic crisis, it is evident that the new member states struggle with generally higher 
unemployment rates. For instance, some countries, such as Cyprus and Croatia have 
unemployment rates above 15%, while some other countries have occasionally approached the 
level of 20%. Macedonia is an obvious outlier in this area with almost three times higher 
unemployment compared to the EU average. In addition, Figure 4 depicts the cyclical nature of 
the unemployment in the new member states, except for Macedonia. Specifically, during the period 
of the global economic expansion from 2006 to 2008, the unemployment rate in EU-28 was 
reduced, reaching the minimum of 7% in 2008. However, later there is a sharp increase in 
unemployment in the EU due to the recession related to the global financial crisis and the European 
debtor crisis. As a consequence of this, in 2013 the rate of unemployment reaches the peak at 
10.9%. 
Figure 4. Unemployment in CEE countries, 2005-2015 
 
Note: Participation of unemployed persons in the overall work force according to ILO. 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
 
Figure 5 provides a brief overview of the poverty rates in new EU member states. What is 
immediately evident is that there are no big differences in the poverty rates between the former 
transition countries. For instance, in 2013, 12 out of 14 analyzed countries had poverty rates above 
20%. What is even more important is the fact that, notwithstanding the cyclical nature of 
unemployment, poverty does not show a declining trend in these economies throughout the 
analyzed period, except for Poland and, to a lesser degree, the Czech Republic. 
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Figure 5. Poverty rates in CEE countries, 2004-2013. 
 
Note: Rate of poverty risk before social transfers. 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
3.4. Wages and productivity 
In this subsection we analyze another indicator that is related to unemployment and poverty – the 
level of wages. In this regard, Figure 6 shows the comparison of the level of wages (expressed in 
Euros) in the new EU member states. As can be noticed, there is an upward trend in the wages in 
all the analyzed countries. For example, during 1999-2011 the wages have increased by 60% in 
Slovenia and Cyprus; more than doubled in Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania; almost tripled in the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia; and have increased almost 3.5 times in Romania. As 
expected, the wage growth was lowest in the countries with a higher initial level of wages (Cyprus 
and Slovenia), and highest in the countries with the lower initial level of wages (Romania). 
Figure 6. Labor costs (left) and productivity (right) CEE, 1999-2014. 
 
Note: Nominal labor productivity per employed person (ESA2010), EU-28 = 100. 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
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Certainly, the dynamics of wages can be connected to the growth of labor productivity. Figure 6 
(the right panel) provides an overview of labor productivity in the new EU member states for the 
period 2003-2014. Here we can see that almost all countries are rather far away from the average 
productivity of EU-28: productivity in Cyprus and Malta is 87% of the European average, after 
which come Slovenia and Slovakia with productivity of 83% and 81.5%, respectively; all other 
countries are under the level of 80%. In fact, the countries with highest productivity have not 
achieved any progress in relation to their level of productivity in 2003 (with the exception of 
Slovakia); quite the opposite, in Cyprus and Malta there is a reduction of the relative productivity. 
All this indicates that the process of convergence of productivity in these countries has stopped, 
although it is unclear at this time whether it is a temporary or permanent phenomenon. 
 
3.5. Economic structure in the EU 
 
Finally, the convergence process can be monitored through the economic structure, represented by 
the share of individual sectors in the creation of gross value added. In this regard, Figure 7 shows 
the average economic structure in EU-28, emphasizing the predominance of services in the value 
added as well as the negligible role of agriculture. Also, it can be seen that the economic structure 
in EU-28 has remained very stable throughout the analyzed period. Though not showed here, the 
detailed inspection of the data confirms the aforementioned conclusion: the share of agriculture 
accounts between two and six percent across the individual countries, while services account for 
between 65 and 70 percent in the gross value added. 
Figure 7. Economic structure in EU-28 
 
Note: Percentage share of the main economic sectors in the gross added value. 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
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4. Empirical evidence on the real convergence of CEE countries 
 
4.1. Data description 
 
Understandably, the previous descriptive analysis serves only for illustrative purposes and ought 
to be accompanied by formal empirical evidence. Therefore, in this this section we provide the 
findings of the econometric investigation of the main determinants of real convergence in the CEE 
countries. In these regards, we regress the relative level of income, i.e. the level of GDP as a 
percentage of the average EU-28 GDP level (gdp) to several macroeconomic, structural and 
institutional variables for a panel of 10 CEE countries during the period between 2000 and 2015. 
Specifically, our sample includes the following countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. We work with annual data 
obtained from the EUROSTAT Database, the World Development Indicators Database, as well as 
World Economic Outlook (April 2016). Although the sample period ranges from 2000 to 2015 
there are many gaps in the data for the individual countries included in the sample. As a 
consequence we end up with 103 observations available for estimation of the regression model. 
The initial specification of the empirical model includes the following regressors: the savings/GDP 
ratio (save), the investment/GDP ratio (invest), trade openness as expressed by the share of total 
foreign trade in GDP (trade), trade integration within EU expressed as a percentage of the 
country’s trade with the EU in total trade (trade), the share of foreign direct investment in GDP 
(fdi), fiscal decentralization expressed as the share of subnational expenditure in GDP (decen), 
unemployment rate (unem), inflation rate (infl), budget deficits as a percent of GDP (budget), the 
share of old population in total population (old), the level of wages expressed in Euros (wage), the 
EBRD index of banking sector reforms (bank), the EBRD index of the capital market reforms 
(sec), the size of the public sector measured by the share of general government expenditure in 
GDP (govern), and the economic structure as expressed by the percentage share of agriculture, 
industry and services in the gross value added, respectively (agri, ind, serv). 
 
4.2. Methodology 
 
We analyse the relationship between government size and fiscal decentralization by means of a 
fixed-effects panel data model, which seems to be more appropriate when working with macro 
panels, especially when the cross-sections are not sampled randomly and when the research 
focuses on the behaviour of the specific sample without drawing inferences about the whole 
population. In addition, the fixed-effects estimator is consistent even when individual effects are 
correlated with the regressors (Baltagi 2008). In these regards, the assumption that the regressors 
are not correlated with the disturbance term, which is critical for employing the random effects 
model, seems to be a priori unrealistic (Wooldridge 2002) as many of the regressors included in 
the model may be correlated with the unobserved country-specific effects. For instance, the 
economic structure may be associated with the country’s geography and history; the level of 
economic development depends on various country-specific cultural and institutional factors; the 
dependent population is affected by the demographic trends in a country; inflation may reflect the 
society’s aversion etc. Formally, we base our choice of the fixed-effects vis-á-vis the random-
effects model on the Hausman-test (Hausman 1978), which in each case rejects the null-hypothesis 
that the regressors and the disturbances are not correlated.5 In addition, our preference for the 
fixed-effects model is supported by the results of the F-test for the joint significance of the fixed 
effects, which are statistically significant in all the variants of the regression model (the results are 
shown at the bottom of Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix). 
The empirical model has the following general specification: 
yit = αi + xit β' + uit                          (1) 
where:  
- y is the dependent variable;  
- x is a k-dimensional vector of explanatory variables; 
- α  and β are the constant and the k-dimensional vector of parameters of the control variables, 
respectively; 
-  u are the residuals; 
- i and t are the country and time subscripts, respectively. 
 
4.3. Discussion of the main findings 
 
Table A1 shows the estimates obtained from the general specification empirical model. The first 
three regressions are virtually the same and they differ only by the variable showing fiscal 
discipline in the sample countries, i.e. budget surplus appears in the first regression, which has 
been replaced with the public debt and public expenditure, respectively. Similarly, the last two 
regressions are virtually the same as the first one as they retain the budget surplus as a regressor, 
differing only with respect to the economic structure variable (the share of manufacturing in GDP, 
                                                          
5 The results of the Hausman-test are available from the authors upon request. 
which is included in the first regression, has subsequently been replaced with the share of 
agriculture and services).  
Table A2 confirms that the process of real convergence is indeed associated with the variables 
included in the regression model as the coefficient of determination is pretty high in all cases. Also, 
the results of F-test show that the fixed effects are highly significant, which can be taken as an 
additional support for the fixed-effects model. Since the sec and old variables have appeared to be 
statistically insignificant in the first regression, they have been excluded from the rest of the model 
specifications. 
In accordance with the traditional empirical growth literature, we find that both the savings and 
investment ratios are statistically significant and economically important determinants of 
economic growth in the CEE countries. Their coefficients have the expected positive signs with 
magnitudes that range from 0.2 to 0.3, thus implying a non-negligible effects on the process of real 
convergence. In addition, the banking sector reforms variable turns out to be highly statistically 
significant in all the specification. The regression coefficient has a positive sign and its magnitude 
ranges from 6 to almost 9, thus, implying very strong effects on convergence process. Also, we 
have obtained the expected results for the two labour market variables (unem and wage) whose 
coefficients are highly significant and economically important. This set of results suggest that 
higher labour market flexibility and efficiency (translated to lower unemployment) accompanied 
by high labour productivity (as proxied by the wage level) have favourable effects on the real 
convergence of CEE economies. Further on, the two macroeconomic variables (infl and budget) 
provide support to the view that macroeconomic stability (low inflation and low budget deficits) 
provide a favourable environment to the convergence process. In these respect, it seems that 
nominal convergence goes hand in hand with real convergence. Finally, we provide a brief 
comment on the only odd result from the regression – the negative coefficient of trade integration. 
Although this is a complex issue calling for a detailed analysis, the negative association between 
trade integration with the EU and real convergence may suggest that the countries that are more 
integrated within the EU market are more heavily exposed to the EU-wide symmetric shocks. As 
a result, they suffer more from the recent stagnation in economic activity following the Global 
financial and economic crisis. On the contrary, the countries that are less integrated within the EU, 
i.e. those with more diversified trade have been able to grow faster than the EU-average. 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The main research task in this paper is to evaluate the progress of CEE economies towards meeting 
the criteria for nominal and real convergence by employing various economic variables. In these 
regards, we provide some basic descriptive statistics, which shows the developments in several 
areas during the period between 1997 and 2014. In addition, we offer a formal econometric 
evidence on the main determinants of the real convergence process. Based on a panel data for 10 
countries during 2000-2015, estimated by the fixed-effects estimator, we find the following main 
results: the standard variables in the growth literature (domestic savings and investment ratios), 
higher labour productivity and banking sector reforms are positively associated with real 
convergence. On the other hand, we find a negative association between unemployment, inflation, 
and budget deficits. All these findings are in line with our a priori expectations about the signs of 
the regression coefficients. In addition, we obtain one puzzling result – the negative association 
between real convergence and the trade integration with the EU, which calls for further research 
in order to be rationalized.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Regression results from the general specification 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
constant 13.1040 14.0204 1.8628 32.3063* 24.6671 
  (20.9614) (21.5716) (22.4120) (17.1964) (17.7471) 
save 0.1440 0.1507 0.1613 0.1880 0.1821 
  (0.1349) (0.1375) (0.1363) (0.1287) (0.1346) 
invest 0.2294* 0.1877 0.2265* 0.1324 0.2183 
  (0.1272) (0.1335) (0.1288) (0.1457) (0.1384) 
open -0.0118 -0.0434  -0.0222 -0.0056 -0.0005 
  (0.0335) (0.0314)  (0.0332) (0.0314) (0.0323) 
trade -0.3031*** -0.2930 ** -0.2702** -0.3230*** -0.3285*** 
  (0.1108)  (0.1139) (0.1113) (0.1071) (0.1097) 
fdi -0.03884 -0.0489 -0.0513 -0.0403 -0.0360 
  (0.0536) (0.0543) (0.0539) (0.0534) (0.0538) 
decent 0.0831** -0.0395*** 0.0258 0.1035 0.0882 
  (0.1630) (0.1519) (0.1593) (0.1628) (0.1642) 
bank 6.2557*** 6.1220*** 5.6186 5.1566** 6.0969*** 
  (2.1510) (2.1909) (2.2038) (2.2812) (2.2454) 
sec 2.3047 2.4889 3.1891* 1.9809 2.3569 
  (1.6673) (1.7203)  (1.6982) (1.6878) (1.6812) 
unem -0.3852** -0.2971  -0.4054** -0.4673*** -0.4526*** 
  (0.1732)   (0.1841) (0.1802) (0.1590) (0.1725) 
wage 0.0085** 0.0102*** 0.0084** 0.0076** 0.0079** 
 (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032) 
infl -0.0589 -0.0616 -0.0574 -0.0308 -0.0636 
 (0.0642) (0.0659) (0.0653) (0.0692) (0.0655) 
budget -0.3262*   -0.2261 -0.3144* 
 (0.1705)   (0.1852) (0.1799) 
ind 0.2425 0.2258 0.2861   
 (0.2659) (0.2709) (0.2735)   
old 1.2206 1.5660* 1.3063 1.1387 1.0036 
 (0.8442) (0.8455) (0.8546) (0.8156) (0.8250) 
debt  -0.0339    
  (0.0449)    
govern   0.2287   
   (0.1705)   
agri    -0.4026  
      
serv     0.0151 
     (0.2120) 
F-test 
16.31 
(0.0000) 
17.13  
(0.0000) 
16.94 
(0.0000) 
22.97 
(0.0000) 
25.09 
(0.0000) 
R2 0.8859 0.8815 0.8833 0.8869 0.8847 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
2. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
Table A2. Regression results from the parsimonious model 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
constant 27.6965* 37.4927*** 26.0795** 40.7507*** 
  (15.1289) (12.0757) (13.1065) (11.9853) 
save 0.1835 0.1900* 0.2374**  
  (0.1145) (0.1148) (0.1167)  
invest 0.2104* 0.2877*** 0.2861** 0.3064*** 
  (0.1170) (0.1093) (0.1126) (0.1043) 
trade -0.3214*** -0.3443*** -0.3039*** -0.3650*** 
  (0.1033) (0.0951) (0.0984) (0.0946) 
bank 6.2730*** 8.3981*** 8.1620*** 8.9182*** 
  (2.1075) (1.7433) (1.8092) (1.7045) 
sec 2.3059    
  (1.6304)    
unem -0.4558*** -0.4085*** -0.4142** -0.3842** 
  (0.1543) (0.1524) (0.1650) (0.1501) 
wage 0.0082*** 0.0117*** 0.0123*** 0.0112*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
infl -0.0770 -0.0950* -0.0971* -0.1090* 
 (0.0576) (0.0570) (0.0587) (0.0565) 
budget -0.3124** -0.3619***  -0.3921*** 
 (0.1310) (0.1289)  (0.1268) 
old 0.9003    
 (0.7579)    
govern   0.2294*  
   (0.1346)  
F-test 
31.62 
(0.0000) 
39.08 
(0.0000) 
36.72 
(0.0000) 
43.01 
(0.0000) 
R2 0.8830 0.8785 0.8716 0.8781 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
2. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
 
